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Abstract
Empirical work has shown that societies can sometimes avoid antisocial out-
comes, such as the Tragedy of the Commons, by establishing institutional rules
that govern their interactions. Moreover, groups are more likely to avoid anti-
social outcomes when they design and enforce their own rules. But this raises
the question: when will group members put effort into maintaining their in-
stitution so that it continues to provide socially beneficial outcomes? Ostrom
derived a set of empirical principles that predict when institutions will endure,
which have subsequently been formalised in agent-based models that are based
on an executable description of the content of an individual’s behaviour. Here
we show how these models can be complemented by evolutionary game theory,
which focuses on the value or payoff of different behaviours, rather than on
the mechanistic content of the behaviour. Using such a value-based model, we
determine exactly when individuals will be incentivised to maintain their insti-
tution and enforce its rules, including the critical amount that a group must
invest into incentivising agents to monitor rule compliance. We highlight the
complementarity of content-based and value-based modelling approaches, and
therefore provide a step towards unifying theoretical and empirical approaches
to understanding enduring institutions and other social phenomena.
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1. Introduction
Cooperation can be defined as a behaviour that provides a benefit to other
individuals, i.e. increases the social welfare of the group. Under the assumption
of self-interested behaviour, micro-economic theory demonstrates that if agents
are to cooperate, then there needs to be the provision of individual incentives5
for them to do so (Oliver, 1980; Olson, 1965). Increasing social welfare in and of
itself is not sufficient; individuals must gain more from cooperating than from
defecting. Left unchecked, this leads to the phenomenon known as the Tragedy
of the Commons (Hardin, 1968), in which antisocial outcomes pervade, such
as the depletion of common-pool resources. This result has been the prevail-10
ing starting point for many socio-economic policy decisions, as well as many
distributed computing design decisions, for several decades.
However, the conclusions of the Tragedy of the Commons rest on the as-
sumption that individuals are playing a particular game form, corresponding to
an n-player version of the single-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (Ostrom, 1990). In15
reality, individuals typically have the potential to change the rules of their social
interactions (North, 1990; Reiter, 1996), by reasoning through the situation in
which they find themselves. In economics, an institution is defined as a family
of game forms (strategies and the mappings between strategies and material
outcomes) that individuals can choose between, given the state of the physi-20
cal environment (e.g. their resource endowments) and their current technology
(Hurwicz, 1996). More informally, we can think of a game form as the “rules of
the game”, and hence of individuals as being able to choose the rules of their
game by creating an institution.
There are many empirical examples of societies being able to avoid anti-social25
outcomes by devising institutional rules that govern their interactions in the use
of common-pool resources such as grazing lands, fisheries, and irrigation systems
(e.g. Ostrom 1990). Example rules include how much water an individual may
take from a shared irrigation system, when they may take it, how often they
must perform maintenance, etc. Furthermore, the empirical work suggests that30
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these rules are self-enforcing (Greif, 2006), in the sense that it pays both for
individuals to follow them, and to take actions that encourage others to follow
them.
From a theoretical viewpoint, the creation of these rules changes the game
form into one where self-interested individuals do best by cooperating (Greif,35
2006; Hurwicz, 1996; North, 1990). The Folk Theorem of game theory explains
why this can work (Binmore, 2014): when interactions are repeated, cooperation
can be sustained as an equilibrium by conditional strategies that respond to the
past behaviour of other agents. One example of such a strategy is Tit-for-
Tat (Axelrod, 1984): cooperate on the first round, and thereafter mirror what40
the other agent did on the previous round. But this is just one example. In
general, the Folk Theorem shows that any strategy that gives an agent more than
the minimax payoff can be sustained as an equilibrium amongst self-interested
agents. The minimax payoff is the largest payoff that an agent can receive if its
opponent tries to minimise the agent’s payoff, which in the Prisoner’s Dilemma45
corresponds to the payoff received when the opponent defects. Therefore, any
strategy that gives the agent a higher payoff than always being defected against
will be an equilibrium when adopted by all of the agents, since if the agent
deviated from this strategy then it could have its payoff reduced to the minimax
payoff by its co-players. Importantly, this result also holds where N -agents50
interact simultaneously (Fudenberg & Maskin, 1986), e.g. in the management
of common-pool resources.
However, cooperation between self-interested agents under the Folk Theorem
requires that the agents value future payoffs, do not know when their interac-
tions will end, and have sufficient information about how other agents have55
behaved in the past. By creating institutional rules, individuals can create a
social environment that satisfies these conditions (Guala, 2012), e.g. by setting
up systems of monitoring (Ostrom, 1990), facilitating the spread of reputation
(Hardy & Norgaard, 2015; Milgrom, North & Weingast, 1990), and decreasing
the outside options of the agents so that they do indeed value future payoffs and60
do not know when their interactions will end (Casari, 2007). Furthermore, the
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creation of institutional rules helps agents to coordinate their behaviour onto
one of the many possible equilibria, by creating shared expectations about how
other agents will behave (Greif, 2006).
Creating, updating and implementing these institutional rules requires time65
and effort. Without this they are likely to collapse and individuals will revert
back to the default game form where cooperation is not favoured. Ostrom’s
field studies suggest that institutions are more likely to endure and maintain
socially beneficial outcomes in the long term when the institutional rules are
both created and implemented by the same agents whose economic interactions70
are affected by those rules. This then raises the question: under what conditions
will self-interested agents be willing to put the effort into doing this, by taking
on various institutional roles? Examples of institutional roles include acting as
a monitor to check for rule compliance, or organising votes on rule changes.
We cannot predict whether institutions will endure in the long term without75
examining the incentives for agents to take on institutional roles.
In order to examine the conditions under which institutions can endure and
maintain cooperation, researchers have recently formalised Ostrom’s principles
of enduring institutions using agent-based models (e.g. Pitt, Schaumeier & Ar-
tikis 2012; Smajgl, Izquierdo & Huigen 2008, 2010). Agent-based modelling80
provides a highly effective method with which to conduct experimental studies
on the consequences of different assumptions about behaviour (Di Paolo, Noble
& Bullock, 2000); in the humanities and social sciences, they have been referred
to as digital petri dishes (Gavin, 2014). Agent-based modelling is a highly at-
tractive approach, primarily due to its ability to capture complex behaviours and85
interactions in executable form, and to explore emergent phenomena simply by
“running” variants of the model (Bonabeau, 2002; Epstein & Axtell, 1996). This
is particularly helpful when building intuition or illustrating counter-examples.
However, due to the complexity of the formal description required, there is also
a limit to its explanatory power. This is particularly true when answering ques-90
tions related to incentivisation and critical values of parameters in a rigorous
way.
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As an alternative, evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith, 1982) is a
more descriptive modelling technique first established in theoretical biology to
study the evolution of adaptive traits in populations of animals. It has since95
been applied in economics, sociology, anthropology, and elsewhere in biology,
and is used to explore both genetic and cultural evolution.
In this paper, we therefore explore how agent-based models, based on execut-
ing the content of strategies, can be complemented by evolutionary game theory,
where a description of the value of strategies instead forms the basis. This allows100
us to draw on existing results and understanding from the evolutionary game
theory literature, in order to provide additional insight. Specifically, we provide
new analytical insight into the effects of different ways of incentivising agents
to take on an institutional monitoring role, and on the optimal proportion of its
resources that a group should invest into monitoring.105
The discussion and results in this paper therefore provide a step towards
unifying theoretical and empirical approaches to understanding the formation
of enduring institutions. Further, we anticipate that this will readily aid research
into other questions of social and cultural nature.
2. The Complementarity of Content-based and Value-based Models110
Both agent-based modelling (ABM) and evolutionary game theory (EGT)
are well-established approaches to modelling social systems, especially in regard
to answering questions relating to population-level results arising from inter-
actions between individuals with (potentially varying) behavioural strategies.
We characterise these as instances of content-based and value-based modelling115
approaches, respectively, and in this section, explore their complementarity in
general. Figure 1 illustrates this.
2.1. What do ABM and EGT capture and what do they assume?
Game theory defines a strategy as a mapping from environmental context to
actions (Binmore, 2005b). An agent’s strategy therefore defines its behaviour,120
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as its environment (including the behaviour of other agents) changes. This
is equivalent to the notion of Russell and Norvig’s agent function (Russell &
Norvig, 2010) in artificial intelligence: the mathematical object that maps a
given percept sequence to an action, and is made explicit through an agent
program. In agent-based modelling, many such agents are instantiated, usually125
employing a software approach based on object-oriented programming1. Each
agent’s program is executed either in turn or in parallel, and is responsible for
maintaining its own state between rounds of the simulation model, over time.
The environment is also typically modelled as a first-class object, again with a
state that may be changed over time, typically as a result of agent actions, or130
by a program that captures natural forces.
By contrast, in evolutionary game theory, an explicit description of the con-
tent of a behaviour and its impact on the environment is not given. Instead,
strategies are considered as traits that may be more or less prevalent in a popu-
lation (which is typically assumed to be infinite and well-mixed), and compete135
with each other in an evolutionary sense. The task is then to write equations
that describe the fitness (i.e., evolutionary value) of a strategy, given the current
frequency of each of all possible strategies in the population. The dynamics of
strategy frequency are then explored, under the assumption that the change in
strategy frequency is correlated with its fitness.140
A key distinction, therefore, can be made in terms of what is captured and
what is assumed in each case. In EGT the existence of a space of possible
behaviours and their expected fitness is presented in a descriptive (equation-
based) form. However, the content of the actions themselves that form part of
the strategy, and lead to this fitness, are omitted. This omission includes any145
deliberative or developmental processes that are assumed to be included in the
execution of the strategy; only the value of any such activity, in evolutionary
terms, is given.
1There are now a range of agent-oriented programming approaches and tools that build
on this basic design principle.
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By contrast, in ABM we provide a description of the content of the modelled
actions, typically in imperative or logical form, along with what effect they have150
on the world and other agents. Thus, it is possible to capture a deep and complex
set of behaviours in an agent, based (for example) on learning, deliberative, and
other cognitive processes. However, there is no explicit description of the value
of carrying out the described activities, and furthermore, such a value is hard
to arrive at, save by executing the agent programs and observing.155
In summary, both leave implicit what is made explicit in the other. Agent-
based models can capture rich behaviours, but struggle to support an analysis
of their value. Conversely, evolutionary game theory provides the necessary
primitives to analyse the incentives and outcomes associated with different be-
haviours in a rigorous way, yet in doing so lacks the ability to capture what may160
be crucial details of the nature of the strategies themselves, and assumes that
any value is accurately defined.
Evolutionary 
Game Theory
Classic 
Game Theory
Computational 
Logic
Imperative 
Behaviour 
Description
Value-based Content-based
Social Interaction 
Modelling Approaches
Figure 1: A sketch of a taxonomy of approaches for modelling systems of social interactions.
The primary distinction made in this paper is between approaches that capture the value
of different strategies, and those that capture the content of those strategies. A range of
game theory variants, including evolutionary game theory, can then be seen as value-based
approaches. Agent-based modelling, and other forms of executable simulation modelling,
instead model the content of agent strategies.
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2.2. Producing a Justifiable Model
In ABM, model justification is usually done through calibration against ob-
served phenomena (Janssen & Ostrom, 2006). First, one observes and captures165
micro-level behaviours (i.e., the behaviour of a single agent in a specific con-
text), producing an agent program that replicates that behaviour. Second, one
then observes macro-level behaviour for already well-understood phenomena,
and the model is calibrated to ensure that known global outcomes are repro-
duced. Additional macro-level outcomes are then reported as predictions of the170
model.
As discussed in Section 2.1, to produce an EGT model, it is required that the
modeller is able to arrive at the evolutionary ‘value’ of each possible strategy,
in a way that justifiably drives strategy frequency. Such a justification is often
plausible: in animal population studies, it is possible to identify which traits are175
correlated with greater numbers of successful offspring, and traits are assumed
to be heritable; in economics, firms are more likely to copy the traits embodied
by financially successful firms than those of bankrupt ones. However, in more
complex social systems where growth in frequency of a strategy is likely to be
strongly determined by human cognitive aspects, and not primarily driven by180
the copying of behaviour, we must be careful to ensure that such a modelling
decision is justified.
2.3. Performing Analysis with ABMs and EGT Models
The primary method of interrogation of ABMs is through experimentation
on the effects of varying different parameters and behavioural rules. Thus, hav-185
ing expressed a set of executable behaviours, one needs to take an inductive
scientific approach to arriving at claims. One varies parameters of the model
(often both those within individual behaviours, as well as those concerning the
world), and one can explore, in a black-box way, the outcomes the system pro-
duces. Typically, a full factorial or similar approach is taken, in order to building190
confidence in claims relating to the effect of varying each parameter.
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In EGT, there is no requirement to execute the model, although the equa-
tions that form the model are often solved numerically through a computer
program, in addition to being analysed in the classic sense. Primarily with
EGT models, one is looking for relationships and critical values that can be195
deduced by solving the equations algebraically. Numerical simulation is often
used to validate these, or to solve where tractability becomes an issue.
2.4. The Complementarity of ABM and EGT
As is hopefully clear from the above discussion, neither ABM nor EGT is
able to replace the other in terms of supporting the full breadth of analysis forms200
that the other provides; both bring something to the table for the modeller of
social systems. Similarly to how, in software engineering, one uses different
language styles, e.g., imperative or functional, for different purposes, in the
modelling of social systems, different modelling approaches are better suited to
address different questions.205
One significant benefit of content-based approaches like ABM is the ability
to make the specification of the model its own execution. A further benefit is
that it is often easier to discern and model the content of an agent’s behaviour,
rather than the value of that behaviour, and to capture this in a model. Content-
based approaches therefore lend themselves more to empirical study, exploring210
the outcome of observed behaviour. This can be achieved without the need to
concern oneself with details of a method of analysis or the model’s solving, be-
yond running and interrogating a simulation. Content-based approaches vary in
how they approach the description of agent behaviours. When using an imper-
ative language (e.g., Lewis & Ekárt (2017) used Java), the solving is embedded215
in the description of the system itself. Alternatively, computational logic (e.g.,
Pitt et al. (2012) used Prolog) may be used to separate behaviour specification
from behaviour execution, the latter being carried out through query resolution.
Value-based approaches share this separation of concerns, however the key ben-
efit in the value-based case is that the description is already a statement that220
quantifies the outcome of carrying out a given behaviour. Therefore, critical
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parameters related to this are more readily accessible and they no longer need
to be induced from the execution. Much of the rest of this paper, especially
Section 5, is devoted to illustrating this benefit in the domain of institutional
modelling.225
2.5. Existing cross-fertilisation between Evolutionary Game Theory and Agent-
Based Modelling
Agent-based and evolutionary game theory models have been successfully
used to feed into each other. One of the first examples was Axelrod’s tour-
nament, where researchers were invited to submit different agent programs to230
play a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game (Axelrod, 1984). This allowed Ax-
elrod to empirically explore the space of different possible strategies, and their
behavioural interactions with each other, rather than having to presuppose a
fixed number in a model. However, analysis of the winning Tit-for-Tat strategy,
in terms of the conditions under which it was stable and the conditions under235
which it could become established in a group, was eased by using a value-based
evolutionary game theory approach (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). More recently,
a similar tournament where researchers submitted agent programs containing
different social learning strategies allowed the traditional assumptions of value-
based models of social learning to be relaxed. This produced new insights that240
have in turn fed back into more descriptive value-based models of social learning
(Rendell, Fogarty, Hoppitt, Morgan, Webster & Laland, 2011).
More generally, content-based ABMs have been used to expand results from
evolutionary game theory by relaxing assumptions such as only a small num-
ber of mutations being present at one time, and no communication between245
players (Adami, Schossau & Hintze, 2016). Going the other way, value-based
models have provided insight into when individual strategies that punish non-
cooperative behaviour can actually be stable (Lehmann, Rousset, Roze & Keller,
2007) that were difficult to achieve in simulation (Boyd, Gintis, Bowles & Rich-
erson, 2003). In the remainder of this paper we examine how similar cross-250
fertilisation can benefit the study of institutions.
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3. Institutions for Managing Common-pool Resources
Many individual behaviours are needed to sustain an institution. These in-
clude designing the rules, voting on them, monitoring the behaviour of group
members, and sanctioning those found breaking the rules. It has been shown255
that if we abstract away from how these behaviours are carried out then institu-
tions can both lead to stable cooperation (Pitt et al., 2012; Sasaki, Brännström,
Dieckmann & Sigmund, 2012), and can evolve de novo (Powers & Lehmann
(2013)). In these models institutional roles, such as designing rules or monitor-
ing rule compliance, are contracted out – it is assumed that some individuals260
will faithfully carry out these roles without shirking or free-riding. But to under-
stand when institutions will be sustainable, we need to understand under what
conditions it pays individuals to perform these roles. While many micro-level
models of monitoring and sanctioning have been produced using classical and
evolutionary game theory, these have not considered the context of institutional265
roles. How do evolving institutional rules affect individual incentives to moni-
tor and sanction? In this study, we analyse different incentivisation mechanisms
from both ABM and EGT perspectives.
3.1. Common-Pool Resource Allocation and the Tragedy of the Commons
A common-pool resource (CPR) is defined by Ostrom (1990, p.30) as “a nat-270
ural or man-made resource system that is sufficiently large as to make it costly
(but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits
from its use”. Examples of such resource systems could be fisheries, various
water resources ranging from groundwater basins to lakes and oceans, irrigation
systems, bridges, and computer clusters. We study resource systems used by275
multiple individuals, who can appropriate or use resource units, such as tons
of fish harvested from a fishery, cubic meters of water withdrawn from a water
resource, number of crossings of a bridge, central processing units consumed on
a cluster computer.
In a game-theoretic formulation of the common-pool resource allocation280
problem, at each time step, given the allocation of resource units to individu-
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als, each individual can decide to comply and appropriate the allocated amount
(cooperate) or not comply and appropriate the amount they wish (defect).
The Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968) is defined as the inevitable
consequence of rational, self-interested individuals appropriating any number of285
resource units that they wish. Over time, as the individuals see the benefits of
their own appropriations, they will increase their appropriations. The common-
pool resource is expected to degrade and become depleted over time, due to the
uncontrolled appropriations from the limited resource.
Historically, attempts to avoid the Tragedy of the Commons have involved290
centralisation or privatisation. With centralisation, an imposed institution
would control the allocation of resource units to appropriators, monitor compli-
ance and sanction non-compliance. In the case of privatisation, the resource is
divided equally among individuals and they then become responsible for their
share. Based on studies of small, closed CPR instances, such as fisheries, Os-295
trom pioneered new forms of institutions, where once the institution is in place,
the individuals would self-organise and self-govern.
3.2. Ostrom’s principles for enduring institutions
Ostrom (1990) has extensively studied the governance of long-enduring, self-
organised and self-governed CPRs, including fisheries, water irrigation systems300
and forests, some as old as 1000 years. The main studied aspects were the
problems of commitment and mutual monitoring.
She defined eight principles for the design of long-enduring institutions:
1. Clearly defined boundaries: As a first step in organising for collective ac-
tion, both the individuals who have the right to appropriate resource units305
from the CPR and the boundaries of the CPR must be clearly defined.
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local condi-
tions: Having rules for appropriation and provision specific to the local
conditions of the particular resource contributes to the endurance of CPRs.
For example, in the Spanish huertas, substantially different rules must be310
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applied in different regions for water irrigation, depending on local speci-
ficity, even though the water management problem is broadly similar.
3. Collective-choice arrangements: Appropriators can participate in the de-
sign of the institution by tailoring the rules over time. It must be noted
that appropriators will not necessarily comply with good operational rules,315
when these exist, even if they took part in their design. Furthermore, even
when reputation is important and individuals share the norm of honouring
agreements, these are insufficient by themselves to ensure stable coopera-
tion in the long term.
4. Monitoring: Monitors, who audit both state condition and appropriation320
behaviour, are part of or accountable to the appropriators. The cost of
monitoring in long-enduring CPRs is often low. For example, in an irriga-
tion system using rotation appropriation rule, monitoring is a by-product:
the individual nearing the end of their turn might wish to extend their
turn, while the next individual ready to start their turn might wish to325
start earlier. They mutually monitor each other and ensure compliance to
the rule by both.
5. Graduated sanctions: Appropriators, who do not respect community rules,
are applied sanctions dependent on the seriousness of their offence, by
appropriators or assigned officials accountable to appropriators, or both.330
The graduated sanctions will have to work hand-in-hand with monitoring
to ensure sufficient level of rule-following and avoid increase in infractions.
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms: There must exist cheap and easily acces-
sible mechanisms to resolve conflicts between appropriators and officials
or among appropriators. Although this by itself does not ensure enduring335
institutions, the maintenance of complex rule systems over time is helped
by it.
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize: External governmental officials
do not challenge the right of appropriators to devise their own institutions.
For example, in a fishery, local fishers can devise the rules who can use the340
fishing ground and with what equipment, without their authority being
13
  
challenged by external governmental officials.
8. Nested enterprises: In case of larger CPRs, organisation of all activities is
in the form of multiple layers of nested enterprises, with small, local CPRs
at their bases.345
3.3. Agent-based modelling of enduring institutions
In this section, we highlight three studies contributing to the agent-based
modelling of enduring institutions, starting from formal axiomatisation (Pitt
et al., 2012) and continuing with the relationship between institutional features
and forms of learning (Lewis & Ekárt, 2017) and relaxation of norms for sus-350
tainable institutions (Kurka & Pitt, 2017).
Pitt et al. (2012) develop a formal axiomatisation of Ostrom’s first six prin-
ciples for CPR in Event Calculus. They implement an executable test-bed and
show that these principles support enduring institutions. They build gradually
more complex and realistic tests for the principles. They find that when the355
agents comply with the rules for appropriation, the first three principles are
sufficient for the institution to endure.2 When the assumptions on compliance
are relaxed, this is not the case any more and the next three principles become
necessary. In their setting, these six principles ensure enduring institutions
with high membership and resource sustainability. Thus, with this work, they360
establish the feasibility of an institution-based approach to dynamic resource
allocation, specifically when long-term endurance is sought.
Lewis & Ekárt (2017) focus on the interplay between institutional features
and forms of learning used by agents. They show that the way the agents learn
influences directly the existence and sustainability of the institution, and at365
the same time, the institution’s features can either tolerate or inhibit learning.
Institutional pardons in the sanctioning mechanism (Ostrom’s principle 5) have
a key role, as they allow for tolerance of behaviours associated with ongoing
learning, such as complacency and exploration.
2Their experiments consider a lifespan of 500 time steps.
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Kurka & Pitt (2017) study the relaxation of norms, in particular of sanction-370
ing strategies for non-compliance in socio-technical systems, in a scenario where
monitoring comes at a cost and also subjective and diverse behaviour of agents
can be expected. They define principled violation of policy as“the active and
intentional decision of an agent of not applying a policy to which it is entitled”
(i.e. a sanction). They demonstrate via a series of experiments on CPR allo-375
cation that strategies of partially applying sanctions lead to more cost-effective
solutions, that are flexible to different scenarios and behaviour.
So, agent-based modelling shows how both institutional pardons and partial
sanction application are mechanisms that can lead to more sustainable insti-
tutions. But how can agents be incentivised to take on the roles that lead to380
sustainable institutions (such as monitoring behaviour or organising votes)?
4. The Challenge of Predicting Conditions for Establishment and Sus-
tenance of Cooperation-Promoting Institutions
Having established the complementarity of value-based and content-based
models in general, and ABM and EGT in particular, in Section 2, our aim is385
to establish the value of each approach in understanding and controlling the
behaviour of agents forming an institution to resolve common-pool resource
allocation problems. The role of ABM has already been well demonstrated in
prior work (as discussed already in this section), therefore, in the remainder of
this paper we focus on illustrating additional insight that can be obtained by390
taking a value-based, evolutionary game theoretic approach.
Using an evolutionary game theoretic model, we focus on the challenge of
predicting conditions for the formation and sustenance of cooperation-promoting
institutions, when individual agents have to be incentivised to take on the insti-
tutional roles that are necessary for this. These predictions would be difficult to395
make from an agent-based model, other than by interrogating it rather labori-
ously in a black-box fashion. Here we aim to derive relations between parameters
in order to answer the following questions:
15
  
1. How many agents need to take on a monitoring role in order to incentivise
cooperation?400
2. What level of investment into monitoring is necessary to incentivise this
number of agents to become monitors?
3. What are the conditions for cooperation to become established given an
initial state where no agent cooperates and no agent monitors?
5. Illustrating the Role and Benefits of Value-based Models405
To illustrate the role and benefits of value-based models, we consider under
what conditions agents can be incentivised to monitor each other’s compliance
with institutional rules. Previous work has recognised that monitoring rule
compliance is necessarily costly. Monitoring can carry both physical costs, e.g.,
energy or CPU cycles, or opportunity costs where the time spent on monitoring410
is time lost carrying out other productive activities. This is true both in natu-
ral systems, such as irrigation systems (Weissing & Ostrom, 2000) and fisheries,
and artificial systems such as community clouds (Khan, Freitag & Rodrigues,
2015) or community co-production energy systems (Torrent-Fontbona, López,
Busquets & Pitt, 2016). Therefore, if self-interested agents are to be incen-415
tivised to monitor rule compliance then they need to be reimbursed for this cost
somehow.
One empirically grounded way in which the costs of monitoring can be re-
imbursed is by using a fraction of the group’s common-pool resource to pay
for monitoring. This fraction of the resource invested into monitoring is an in-420
stitutional fact, i.e., it is determined by the current institutional rules. Several
models have examined the effect of different levels of investment into monitoring
at an abstract level (Balke, De Vos & Padget, 2013; Jaffe & Zaballa, 2010; Pitt
& Schaumeier, 2012; Powers, 2018; Powers & Lehmann, 2013), by assuming that
the probability that an agent is monitored for rule compliance is proportional425
to the amount of resource invested into monitoring. But these models did not
examine what would happen if agents have to choose whether or not they will
16
  
take on the monitoring role, and how the level of monitoring will consequently
evolve over time. Here we take this theoretical work further by developing a
micro-level model that considers agents explicitly choosing whether or not to430
take on a monitoring role when they must pay a cost for doing so.
In the sections below we develop a general descriptive model and then con-
sider several variants in which monitoring is incentivised in different ways.
5.1. Base Model
We consider a model in which n agents take part in a linear public goods435
game to provision a common-pool resource. Each agent makes three decisions: i)
whether or not to cooperate by provisioning the common pool at a cost to itself;
ii) whether or not to pay a tax to support implementation of the institution; and
iii) if a member, whether or not to monitor other agents to determine whether
or not they have contributed.440
Agents that both did not provision to the common pool and were monitored
(thus caught) are sanctioned, creating a cost to free-riding (CF).
Provisioning the common- pool resource, as well as taking on the monitoring
role, carries some cost to the agent (CC and CM, respectively). Monitors are
reimbursed for their work according to two different schemes that we compare445
and contrast below. The process is then repeated for a number of rounds T .
Thus, the utility of an individual agent will be built up from a base utility,
the individual’s share of the common-pool resource, the individual’s cost if they
contribute to the common-pool, the individual’s cost if instead they free-ride,
the individual’s net benefit if they take on a monitoring role, and the individual’s450
cost of paying a tax to support the institution (Cτ ).
More formally, the utility of agent i at round t is given explicitly by the
following function:
ui(t) = u0 +BG(t)− ιiCCC − (1− ιiC)CF(t) + ιiM[BM(t)− CM]− ιiτCτ , (1)
where ιiC, ιiM and ιiτ are indicator variables that take the value 1 if the agent455
contributes to the common pool, monitors, and pays tax to support the insti-
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tution, respectively, and 0 otherwise. In this utility function, u0 is a baseline
utility in the absence of social interactions. The term BG(t) represents the
individual’s share of the common-pool resource, computed as:
BG(t) =
1
n
× αnC(t), (2)460
where nC(t) is the number of agents that provisioned the common resource on
round t (the number of agents with ιC = 1) and α is a model parameter repre-
senting the amount of resource that each agent provides when they provision.
The parameter CC represents the cost to the agent of provisioning α units of
common-pool resource. Following the definition of a linear public goods game,465
we assume that CC < α, i.e. there is a benefit to agents of cooperating together
to share their resources.
The term CF(t) represents the cost of free-riding, i.e. of an agent not pro-
visioning the common pool. This cost is paid by all agents with ιC = 0. The
cost is calculated as the probability than an agent is monitored, multiplied by470
the sanction imposed if detected free-riding, s. This is computed as:
CF(t) =
pnM(t)
n
s, (3)
where nM(t) is the number of agents that take on the monitoring role at round t,
i.e. the number of agents with ιM = 1, and p is the number of agents monitored
by each monitor. We assume that each monitor monitors a different, non-475
overlapping, set of agents, and that an agent is not monitored more than once.
This corresponds to an assumption that agents have the technology to perfectly
coordinate their monitoring.
The term BM(t) represents the amount that monitors are reimbursed for
their monitoring work. We examine different ways in which monitoring can be480
paid for, and hence different expressions for BM(t), in Section 5.2 and 5.3.
The term CM represents the cost to agent i of monitoring other agents. The
cost of monitoring a single agent is δ, so the total cost to an agent of monitoring
on one round is
CM = pδ. (4)485
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Finally, the parameter Cτ represents the tax paid each round to support
implementation of the institutional arrangements, which is paid by all agents
with ιτ = 1.
The costs of monitoring, contributing to the common pool, and paying tax
to support implementation of the institutional arrangements are constant ev-490
ery round, depending only on model parameters. By contrast, the individual’s
share of the common-pool resource, the benefit of monitoring, and the cost of
free-riding are dynamic variables that depend on the values of the model state
variables nC(t), nM(t) and nτ (t) during that round.
We are interested in the conditions under which agents will create a system of495
monitoring that incentivises cooperation, i.e. that makes the cost of provisioning
less than the cost of freeriding (CC < CF(t)). To determine this, we consider
the evolution of the three agent behavioural traits ιC, ιM, and ιτ when agents
with those traits are in competition with each other (Maynard Smith, 1982).
An evolutionary game theory analysis considers that there are eight possible500
types of agents depending on the values of their ι traits, and tracks the frequency
of each type in the population. All agents with the same type are assumed to
have the same utility. Specifically, we take an agent type’s utility in round t
from Equation 1 as the fitness of that type of agent in generation t, i.e. one
round corresponds to one generation. The frequency of an agent type in the next505
generation is then proportional to its fitness (i.e. fitness proportionate selection),
as described by the standard replicator equation (see, e.g. Maynard Smith 1982).
However, direct analysis by means of the replicator equation is complicated
because of the large number of types, and the possible effects of covariance
between the different traits. To ease analysis we therefore consider each trait510
independently, asking when an agent will gain fitness by switching the corre-
sponding ι value from 0 to 1 (or vice versa).
Importantly, an evolutionary game theory analysis does not assume genetic
transmission of traits. Rather, it can be used to capture social learning where
agents imitate the traits of other agents, and are more likely to imitate traits that515
they observe to bring a higher payoff – so-called payoff-biased social learning
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(Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981). We proceed by
analysing the above equations to determine inequalities capturing the conditions
under which provisioning is favoured (i.e. individuals evolve an ιC value of 1).
5.2. Variant 1: Individuals make a unilateral decision about whether to con-520
tribute to a separate pool of monitoring fees
In the first variant of the model, monitors take their payment from the
separate pool of institutional taxes paid by agents with ιτ = 1. Specifically, BM
is computed as:3
BM =
βnτCτ
nM
, (5)525
where β is the proportion of institutional taxes that are invested into monitoring
and nτ is the number of agents that pay the institutional taxes (i.e that have
ιτ = 1).
This model represents each agent making a unilateral decision about whether
to make a separate contribution to sustain implementation of the institutional530
rules or not, in a manner similar to pool punishment models studied in evolu-
tionary biology (Sigmund, De Silva, Traulsen & Hauert, 2010; Sigmund, Hauert,
Traulsen & Silva, 2011; Traulsen, Röhl & Milinski, 2012).
The first question that we can ask from our value-based evolutionary game
theoretic model is: when does it pay an agent to cooperate, i.e. when will the535
fitness (utility) of an agent be greater if they cooperate than if they do not?
In other words, when is cooperation incentivised, such that agents with ιC = 1
outcompete agents with ιC = 0? Cooperation will be incentivised when the cost
of cooperating is less than the cost of free-riding, i.e. CC < CF. This occurs
when CC < psnMn , which entails that the proportion of monitors must satisfy540
the inequality:
nM
n
>
Cc
ps
. (6)
3For the purpose of analysis, we do not use the time step in the remainder of the paper.
As we are not interested in the evolution over time, but the analysis at a given moment in
time, this makes the expressions easier to read.
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We can see from this that increasing CC will increase the number of monitors
that are necessary to incentivise cooperation, while increasing either the number
of agents that each monitor monitors for rule compliance (p) or the sanction545
imposed on a free-riding agent when they are monitored (s) will decrease the
number of monitors that are necessary. As such, the value-based model makes
clear and precise predictions about the amount of monitoring that is necessary.
This is in contrast to executable content-based models of institutions (e.g. Pitt
& Schaumeier, 2012), where large numbers of experiments have to be run to550
attempt to derive such inequalities by brute force numeric searching of the
effects of model parameter values.
The next question that it is important to ask is: when will this level of
monitoring be sufficiently incentivised, such that it individually pays all of these
agents (nM) to take on the monitoring role? Performing monitoring will be555
advantageous for an agent when BM > CM, that is when βnτCτnM > pδ. We can
rearrange this to highlight the relationship between the frequency of tax payers
and the frequency of monitors:
nτ
n
βCτ
pδ
>
nM
n
. (7)
This means that, to incentivise monitoring, the frequency of tax payers mul-560
tiplied by the amount βCτpδ needs to be greater than the frequency of monitors.
If this amount is less than 1 – assuming that all of the agents are self-interested –
then not every tax payer can be a monitor. Although there are possibilities to
make this amount larger than 1 (i.e. by setting Cτ to a large value or having a
low cost of monitoring δ), we are most interested in the case when this is less565
than 1, because then there is a decision to be made, whether to monitor or not.
As inequalities 6 and 7 are both expressed in terms of the proportion of agents
in the population performing monitoring, we can combine them to obtain the
inequality nτn
βCτ
pδ >
CC
ps that must hold irrespective of the value of
nM
n . By
rearranging, we obtain570
δ
s
<
1
n
βnτCτ
CC
. (8)
So, the ratio of the monitoring cost (δ) to the sanction for free-riding (s) needs to
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be less than the ratio of one agent’s share of the monitoring pool tax ( 1nβnτCτ )
to the cost of cooperation (CC). Of these, s, β and Cτ are likely to be at least
partly under the control of the agents themselves, i.e. they are institutional575
facts. Choosing values for these accordingly ensures that it pays for nM agents
to do monitoring.
Finally, we need to examine the incentives to pay the institutional taxes,
which in turn pay for some agents to monitor by providing βCτ units of resource
for monitoring. Exactly as for our analysis for the traits ιC and ιM, for tax580
paying to be incentivised the cost of the tax needs to be less than the benefit
to the individual agent of paying the tax. But we can see from Equation 1 that
there is no individual benefit to paying the tax, i.e. there is no Bτ term. The
benefits of paying tax are manifest through their use in incentivising monitoring
and hence cooperation. But these benefits are shared equally with all of the585
agents, since the common-pool resource that is provisioned through cooperation
is shared equally by all agents (Equation 2). Therefore, in this model self-
interested agents will not pay institutional taxes, which means that there will
be no resources invested into monitoring, and hence self-interested agents will
not monitor. Then, in the absence of monitoring self-interested agents will not590
cooperate. In other words, monitoring itself becomes subject to a second-order
tragedy of the commons (Axelrod, 1986; Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Fowler, 2005;
Perc, 2012).
This problem is clearly highlighted by the equations of this model, since it
is specified in terms of the value of each strategy. This shows that monitoring595
cannot be favoured for any set of parameters. Relying solely instead on a model
that captured the content of behaviours, and not their value, would mean that
an exhaustive search of parameter settings would need to be carried out in order
to be sure that the lack of monitoring and cooperation was not an artefact of
the particular parameter values chosen.600
We now turn to investigate other ways in which monitoring can be incen-
tivised.
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5.3. Variant 2: Monitoring is paid for from the common-pool resource
In this variant, monitors take their payment directly from the common-pool
resource according to a parameter β, which represents the proportion of the605
group’s common-pool resource that is invested into monitoring. This is an in-
stitutional fact, i.e. part of the institutional rules. It corresponds more closely
to several of the empirical examples given by Ostrom (1990), where agents use
their common resources to either hire monitors that are accountable to them-
selves, or to reward certain group members for taking on the monitoring role.610
This involves agents making a collective decision about how much their group
invests into monitoring (Conradt & List, 2009; Conradt & Roper, 2003), in con-
trast to the unilateral decision in Variant 1 of the model. In other words, agents
play a political game in which they bargain and negotiate over the institutional
rules and how to enforce them (Hurwicz, 1996; Reiter, 1996). This political615
game would result in setting the value of β in our model. The evolutionary
dynamics of individual agent preferences for the value of β have been studied
elsewhere (Powers, 2018; Powers & Lehmann, 2013). Here we do not consider
the dynamics of exactly how β is set by a political game, but we instead focus
on the effects of β on the level of monitoring that is incentivised.620
In Variant 2 of the model, Cτ is set to 0, since monitoring is now paid for
from the common-pool resource. This means that we no longer have to consider
the evolution of ιτ (it is a neutral trait). Since a fraction β of the common-
pool resource is now used to pay for monitoring, the remaining fraction 1−β is
distributed amongst all of the agents. Thus Equation 2 becomes:625
BG(t) = (1− β) 1
n
× αnC(t) (9)
The individual benefit of monitoring, BM, is then computed as:
BM =
αβnC
nM
. (10)
The inequality for cooperation to be favoured remains the same as in Variant
1, i.e. nMn >
Cc
ps . Monitoring, however, will now be incentivised when
αβnC
nM
>
pδ. Rearrangement of this highlights the relationship between the frequency
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of monitors and the frequency of cooperation that is necessary to provide a630
sufficient amount of common-pool resource to pay for these monitors:
nM
n
<
nC
n
αβ
pδ
. (11)
From this we can draw out the roles of the parameters α, β, p and δ.
For full cooperation (i.e. every agent cooperates) to be an equilibrium, the
largest frequency of monitors for which monitoring is individually incentivised635
in (11) needs to be greater than the frequency of monitors that is necessary to
sustain full cooperation. This means that the following condition must hold,
based on (11) and (6):
nC
n
>
CC
s
δ
αβ
(12)
where by setting nCn = 1 we obtain:
αβ
δ
>
Cc
s
. (13)
The parameter p, the number of agents monitored by each monitor, appears on640
the denominator of both sides and so cancels out. This is a result of the assump-
tion that monitors sample agents to monitor without replacement (Equation 3),
and so doubling p means that half as many monitors are needed to sample the
same number of agents.
When the relationship among the parameters in (13) holds then full coop-645
eration will be an equilibrium. At this equilibrium, monitoring will go to the
maximum frequency at which it is incentivised, which is when nMn =
αβ
pδ (subject
to the constraint that nMn cannot exceed 1). When αβ < pδ then this will be
less than 1, and so selection on ιM will depend on the frequency of monitoring
already in the population, leading to an interior equilibrium for the frequency650
of monitoring. Conversely, when αβ >= pδ and (13) hold then there is an
equilibrium in which every agent cooperates and every agent monitors. From
(11) it follows that if αβ < pδ then monitoring and cooperation cannot be
linked (or the same) traits, since the number of incentivised monitors is less
than the number of incentivised cooperators by a fraction αβpδ . Thus if we force655
every cooperator to monitor then self-interested agents will neither cooperate
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or monitor if αβ < pδ. To promote cooperation in this kind of environment
we should not, therefore, promote a policy in which every agent should both
cooperate and monitor. This is in contrast to the findings of models of “peer
punishment”, where each agent makes a unilateral decision about whether or660
not to monitor and punish other agents and pays a unilateral cost for doing
so. In these models, monitoring and punishment are promoted if cooperation
and monitoring are linked traits, such that agents copy them as a pair (Boyd
& Richerson, 1992; Lehmann et al., 2007). Thus, changing from unilateral to
collective decision-making about how much to invest into monitoring changes665
whether or not we should try to force all agents to monitor, or only a subset.
We can now ask, what is the minimum value of β necessary to make full
cooperation an equilibrium? This can be derived from rearranging (13):
β >
δCC
αs
. (14)
When this inequality holds, and the agents are all cooperating, then a sufficient670
level of monitoring is incentivised to maintain full cooperation. This allows us to
answer the important practical question: how much of their resources should a
group invest into monitoring? The proportion of their common-pool resources,
β, that they should invest in order to maintain cooperation is the smallest value
that satisfies (14). Investing any more than this is wasteful. This highlights675
how value-based models can produce precise predictions about how to control
a system.
So far our analysis has focussed on the conditions under which full coop-
eration will be an equilibrium. However, a separate question is under what
conditions a group of agents will reach this equilibrium if they start out with680
no cooperation and no monitoring. We first ask what frequency of monitoring
is necessary to incentivise cooperation when there are no cooperators in the
group? From the previous results this is given by (6), which is independent of
the frequency of cooperators. We then need to ask if this level of monitoring
is incentivised when there are no cooperators in the population. Monitoring685
is incentivised when condition (11) is met. We can immediately see that this
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cannot be satisfied when nCn = 0, i.e. when no agents are currently cooperating.
Consequently, there is also an equilibrium in which no agent monitors and no
agent cooperates (6 and 11).
This equilibrium in which no agent cooperates or monitors represents a nat-690
ural starting point when considering the origin of institutions. How, then, might
a group break free from this equilibrium and move to the cooperate and monitor
equilibrium that increases social welfare? Moving away from this equilibrium
will initially require some agents to monitor for free, i.e. to discount the cost
of monitoring in their utility functions. The critical fraction of monitors to695
select for an increase in cooperation is CCps (as per (6)). Therefore, initially
at least this proportion of agents needs to start monitoring while ignoring the
costs. Then, as some agents start to cooperate then the costs of monitoring
will start to be repaid. For a given non-zero frequency of cooperators, a greater
frequency of monitoring costs will be repaid when the proportion of CPR used700
for monitoring (β) is greater. This suggests that in order to reduce the amount
of “charity” that monitors must initially perform, a group should initially set its
β to a large value. This can then be reduced down to that given by (14) once
full cooperation is reached (see also Chen, Sasaki, Brännström & Dieckmann
2015 for a similar argument concerning switching from rewards to punishments705
to incentive cooperation as cooperation increases in frequency).
The frequency of cooperation required to fully pay for monitoring is given by
the limit in (12), nCn =
δ
αβ
CC
s . When this is less than 1 then there will be excess
funds available at the full cooperation equilibrium that can be used to reimburse
agents that initially suffered a cost for their monitoring, such that they do not710
pay a net lifetime cost even if they initially perform monitoring for free. This
effect could likely be captured to some extent in a value-based model using
strategies that make a commitment (Han, Pereira & Lenaerts, 2017), or that
incorporate reinforcement learning of payoffs from imagined actions (Dridi &
Lehmann, 2014). However, because we are describing a behaviour that requires715
agents to be forward-looking to some degree, it cannot be fully captured in
an evolutionary game theory model where individuals’ cognition is completely
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myopic. It could, however, be explored easily in an executable content-based
model that implements cognitive theories of agent behaviour.
6. Recommendations720
In this section, we offer some recommendations arising from this study, aimed
at those using modelling approaches to understand, control and design social
and socio-technical systems.
6.1. Recommendation 1: Use both content-based and value-based approaches
In this study, we have shown that existing results, found in the literature,725
and obtained from agent-based modelling techniques, can be complemented with
those obtained by taking an evolutionary game theory approach. The results in
Section 5 would have been difficult to obtain empirically. However, the evolu-
tionary game theory approach would also struggle to obtain results concerning
the interactions of more complex cognitive agent behaviours, such as those asso-730
ciated with richer human social interactions. Therefore, in order to benefit from
the complementarity that each provides, our first recommendation is to use both
content-based and value-based modelling approaches to build understanding of
a social or socio-technical system.
The risk associated with not doing this is that it is easy otherwise for the re-735
sulting understanding to be limited by the assumptions present in one modelling
form. By taking only a content-based approach, it is unlikely that the modeller
will arrive at statements concerning the utility of a particular behaviour in a
particular context, even though these might in some cases be quite obvious, once
considered. Conversely, taking a purely value-based approach may discourage740
consideration of the effect of interacting cognitive agents. As an example of the
latter, Ostrom’s work highlights that, while the Tragedy of the Commons is a
perfectly valid result given the assumed game rules and behaviour model, hu-
mans in practice are able to reflect on this situation, and put measures in place
to change the rules of the game. Such a solution does not naturally arise within,745
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say, a purely game theoretic framing of the problem. However, by viewing the
problem from multiple theoretical standpoints, assumptions become more ap-
parent and therefore open to challenge.
6.2. Recommendation 2: Don’t worry if the value-based model is not complete
It is tempting to think that, unless one has a complete value-based model of750
the system, any model that has been produced would have limited value. While
it is true that we can obtain more complete results from more complete models,
even partial value-based models can expose inequalities that provide valuable
insight.
For example, a more complete analysis of the common-pool resource alloca-755
tion problem studied in this article would consider selection on both cooperation
and monitoring at the same time, and arrive at statements accounting for the
co-variance between them. However, even without doing this, we have been
able to arrive at useful analytical results that provide insight beyond what was
readily obtainable using agent-based methods.760
6.3. Recommendation 3: Go for the qualitatively equivalent, but more tractable
alternative
Often seemingly innocuous changes to a model can drastically change the
tractability of value-based models. An example is provided by the assumption
here that each monitor perfectly coordinates to monitor a non-overlapping set765
of agents, i.e. that sampling from the pool of agents to be monitored is without
replacement. An alternative would be to assume that this sampling is with
replacement, so that different monitors may end up monitoring the same agent
in the same round, because their monitoring actions are uncoordinated. This
then means that the proportion of agents monitored does not increase linearly770
with the number of monitors, but instead increasing the number of monitors
produces diminishing marginal returns in terms of the proportion of agents
covered.
28
  
This assumption would be operationalised in the model by changing Equa-
tion 3 to CF(t) = [1−(1− pn )nM(t)]s. This would leave our results concerning the775
number of agents that are incentivised to monitor (inequality 11) unchanged.
However, it would change the level of monitoring that is necessary to incen-
tivise cooperation (inequality 6). But presenting this revised inequality in an
intuitive form in terms of nMn is now much more difficult. Consequently, it is
much harder to gain insight into how cooperation is likely to change with in-780
vestment into monitoring, and harder to gain insight into the conditions under
which cooperation and monitoring can become established in a group.
In reality, groups are likely to lie somewhere on a continuum between per-
fectly coordinated monitoring and completely uncoordinated monitoring, with
their position depending on the monitoring technology available to them. This785
suggests that assuming perfectly coordinated monitoring, as in Equation 3, is
as reasonable as assuming completely uncoordinated monitoring, but has the
crucial advantage of providing intuitive insight. More generally, it is often pos-
sible to tweak model assumptions such that the qualitative insight of the model
is still valid, but the analysis is both more tractable and more intuitive.790
7. Discussion
In this article we have demonstrated and explored the complementarity of
agent-based and evolutionary game theoretic modelling approaches for social
and socio-technical systems, which we characterised as instances of content-based
and value-based approaches, respectively. We have shown that each approach795
brings with it different assumptions, and also offers the potential for different
insights, and hence both provide value.
7.1. Implications for enduring institutions
Our results suggest that how agents decide on the amount that their group
should invest into monitoring is critical to whether or not a sufficient investment800
to promote cooperation will be achieved. If each agent makes a completely uni-
lateral decision about the amount of its resources to invest, then the model
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predicts that agents are unlikely to produce a sufficient investment. This ac-
cords with the findings of peer-punishment (Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Lehmann
et al., 2007) and pool-punishment (Perc, 2012; Sigmund et al., 2010, 2011) mod-805
els from evolutionary biology. Various suggestions have been made to overcome
this problem, including punishment of individuals that do not invest into mon-
itoring (i.e. second-order punishment Axelrod 1986; Boyd & Richerson 1992;
Perc 2012), signalling an intention to punish beforehand (Boyd, Gintis & Bowles,
2010), and the proposition that agents do conformity-biased social learning and810
so will tend to imitate behaviour to invest into monitoring when the majority
of other agents are already investing (Boyd et al., 2003).
There is likely to be some element of conformity bias in human groups
(but see also Binmore 2005a; Burton-Chellew, Mouden & West 2017; Burton-
Chellew, Nax & West 2015; Lamba 2014; Lamba & Mace 2011 for critiques of815
experiments that argue for conformity in collective action situations). However,
field studies suggest that real collective-action problems tend to be solved by
the creation of institutional rules that promote cooperation and monitoring (Os-
trom, 1990). These often involve groups making a collective decision to invest a
share of their common-pool resources to either hire monitors, or to incentivise820
group members themselves to act as monitors. Where this occurs, then our
micro-level model demonstrates that sufficient monitoring can be incentivised
(Variant 2), in contrast to the case where the decision is unilateral (Variant 1).
By explicitly modelling incentivisation using evolutionary game theory, we
can make a precise prediction about the proportion of its resources that a group825
should invest into monitoring (relation 14). Furthermore, the model suggests
that a group should invest more into monitoring when an institution is trying
to become established from an initial state with little cooperation. Finally, the
model predicts that cooperation will not become established unless some agents
initially monitor “for free”, i.e. discount the cost of monitoring in their utility830
function. Then, as cooperation starts to become established more and more
of this monitoring will become incentivised. Moreover, we showed conditions
under which when agents are at the full cooperation equilibrium then there is
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sufficient investment into monitoring not only to pay for monitoring at that
time, but to reimburse agents that initially monitored for free, such that they835
do not pay a lifetime cost for this.
7.2. Implications for modelling social and socio-technical systems
Figure 1 illustrated that, even within the family of value-based approaches,
there are a variety of alternatives available, and the potential for others to be
developed. Exploring these, and characterising the assumptions between classic840
game theory and evolutionary game theory, we can see two ends of a possible
spectrum where different levels of (bounded) rationality are captured. Game
theory, in its various forms, provides a natural way to examine issues related
to the incentivisation of behaviour. It has proven to be useful across both the
natural and social sciences, from biology through to anthropology, sociology,845
economics and computer science. A key point is what the various types of game
theory assume about the cognition of agents.
On the one hand, classic game theory assumes that agents are both rational
and fully forward-looking, being able to work out the consequences of their ac-
tions for an infinite number of rounds in the future. It is recognised that neither850
human nor artificial agents have the computational power or sufficient infor-
mation about the consequences of their actions to do this. Consequently, this
assumption has been relaxed to some extent with models of bounded rational-
ity (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001). On the other hand, evolutionary game theory
assumes that agents are completely myopic, only caring about their payoff in855
that “generation” (Maynard Smith, 1982). For this reason, evolutionary game
theory is often seen as a safe minimal assumption to make about the cognition
of agents. Most formal models of cultural evolution theory also rest on this as-
sumption of myopia and extremely limited cognition, which they operationalise
by using equations from population genetics to model the spread of cultural860
traits by imitation (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981).
Put bluntly, humans are assumed to copy others because they are unable to
attempt to calculate what they should do, or it is too costly for them to do so
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(Richerson & Boyd, 2005).
Our model suggests that an assumption of complete myopia is problematic865
for explaining the origin of cooperation-promoting institutions. Our results
imply that some agents initially need to take on a monitoring role while ignoring
the immediate costs, since this will lead to an equilibrium where these costs can
be more than repaid. But if individuals are completely myopic, monitoring will
not get off the ground unless we assume forces exogenous to the model such as870
“stochastic shocks” that induce a proportion of agents to simultaneously start
cooperating (Foster & Young, 1990), or large numbers of cooperating agents
arriving from other groups (Boyd et al., 2003). While both of these forces
can theoretically produce the result where agents reach the full cooperation
equilibrium, they do not correspond particularly well to human behaviour in875
many common-pool resource situations in the field (Ostrom, 1990). Rather,
they are a way of forcing equilibrium shifts into a myopic model.
This suggests that a more natural way to model the origin of cooperation-
promoting institutions is needed, for example by using content-based models as
a complement. Content-based models allow us to capture different theories of880
cognition in the agent’s architecture and examine the result of interactions be-
tween agents based on those theories. For example, BDI (Rao & Georgeff, 1995),
HCogAff (Sloman, 2001), ACT-R (Anderson, Bothell, Byrne, Douglass, Lebiere
& Qin, 2004), SOAR (Laird, 2012), or the range of agent architectures discussed
by Russell & Norvig (2010), are all viable approaches to capture bounded rea-885
soning processes as well as, in some cases, human emotions and other qualitative
states and values such as trust, fairness and justice (Pitt, 2016).
In the short term, however, we believe that it is important for modellers
to provide clarity concerning whether their models either assume or explore the
extent to which agents engage in cognition, or if they assume that agents simply890
‘behave’. This is important, because model predictions may vary drastically as
a result, and thus it provides the context for any resulting insight.
Finally, another line of research would be to consider whether evolutionary
game theory, or other value-based approaches, can be extended to capture more
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complex agent behaviour, where the value of a behaviour is not readily obtain-895
able in general. One idea could be to induce the value of behaviours empirically,
perhaps as a second layer in a value-based model. How, for example, might the
assumption of bounded rationality be parametrised in order to capture varying
levels of agents’ capacities for knowledge gathering and reasoning, with this be-
ing linked to the value (e.g., fitness) of carrying out such cognitive behaviour?900
An architectural schema or styles perspective (Lewis, Platzner, Rinner, Tørre-
sen & Yao, 2016; Russell & Norvig, 2010; Sloman, 2001) provides one way to
explore this space, and combining this with the evolution of traits may provide
a way of exploring the extent to which agents faced with a social dilemma can
be expected to engage in cognitive behaviour to reason through their situation.905
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